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The main aim of the NPT since 1970 was prevention offurther spread of nuclear weapons
based on two conditions, nondevelopment of its own nuclear weapons and availability of nuclear
technology for non-military use. Two issues were critical at the fifth NPT conference: Middle
East and general nuclear weapons. During 1995 the member states of the NPT have established a
programme for nuclear disarmament which included agreement on CTBT till 1996, negotiations on
the Fissile Materials Cut/Off Treaty, and determined attempts to start negotiations about systematic
and progressive nuclear disarmament. The "New Agenda Coalition" marked a middle way to nuclear
disarmament after the 1996 session of the International Court of Justice, introducing concepts of
de-alerting, non-first use, and negative security assurances. Finally, a possible abolition of the NPT
regime could only contribute to further nuclear proliferation, which calls for establishment of new
structures within the NPT
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1. Introduction
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nu-
clear Weapons or NPT, to which 187 states are sig-
natories, recently held a sixth Review Conference in
New York. The main objective of the NPT, which
came into force in 1970, is to prevent the further
proliferation of nuclear weapons, and is based on
two assumptions. In return for not developing their
own nuclear programmes, the non-nuclear states
were promised (1) help from the nuclear states in
the process of nuclear disarmament and (2) unhin-
dered access to nuclear energy for non-military pur-
poses. At this moment there are only four states not
in the NPT: Cuba, which does not have its own nu-
clear programme, and Israel, India and Pakistan,
which do.
Five years ago the NPT was indefinitely ex-
tended, which was the main aim and ambition of the
western nuclear powers headed by the USA. The
decision to extend the NPT was made as a packet of
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decisions, including agreements about stepping up
the review process, and acceptance of the document
Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-prolif-
eration and Disarmament, which functions as a yard-
stick to measure progress in implementing the pro-
visions of the NPT. At the same time, the fifth Re-
view Conference adopted a resolution on the Mid-
dle East, seeking the establishment of a zone with-
out weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East,
most of all because of the concerns of the Arab coun-
tries related to the nuclear and biological programmes
in Israel.
The sixth Review Conference had the chance
for the first time to evaluate the suitability of the
new review process of 1995, and the opportunity to
provide for the maintenance of a strong and credible
regime for the reduction of the nuclear threat and
the prevention of the spread of nuclear arms. Unfor-
tunately, it was not possible to overcome the differ-
ences in the stances of the opposed blocs, and the
gap between the various demands of the non-aligned
countries vis-r-vis the views of the West became in-
creasingly large. More precisely, the non-aligned
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countries stand for complete nuclear disarmament
under international control and with a precise time-
table. The nuclear powers, and the Western group,
support the continuation of bilateral efforts of the
two main nuclear countries (the US and the Russian
Federation), going on to multilateral negotiations
when the conditions are ripe.
Two essential matters were nearly the reason
for the review process coming to grief at the fifth
Review Conference in 1995 - the Middle East and
universal nuclear disarmament. During the 2000 re-
view process there were additional circumstances in
the concerns of China and Russia with respect to the
American plans for the development of a Limited
National Missile Defence or LNMD, the conse-
quences of which for these two states would have
been a considerable modification of the existing sys-
tem of equilibrium of power of the accepted nuclear
states (P-5) and the non-ratification of the Compre-
hensive Test Ban Treaty or CTBT by some of the
key states without which the CTBT cannot come into
force. I And anyway, there was a reiteration of the
demand of the members of the Non-Aligned nations
Movement (NAM) for the starting of negotiations
about universal and total nuclear disarmament and
the undertaking of practical measures for the imple-
mentation of measures as defined in Article VI of
the NPT. According to the NAM this implies given
a clear undertaking to the non-nuclear states of the
NPT that nuclear disarmament will be carried out
under international control, according to a strictly
defined timetable.
Also of particular importance, and a reason
for concern for the future of the NPT, are the intran-
sigent stances of India and Pakistan, and to a degree
of Israel as well, with respect to the development of
their own nuclear programmes, in the face of con-
demnation by the international community, especially
after the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998
and the quite blatant way in which these states are
developing their nuclear doctrines and arsenals.
The sixth Review Conference was unfortu-
nately not able to avoid the current realities, and in-
ternational political relations are the context in which
the NPT has to function. Positive progress achieved
in the early 90s with respect to a reduction in nu-
clear arms gradually turned into a deterioration of
the relations among the key states, particularly be-
tween the US and Russia to do with the expansion of
NATO and the intentions of the US to develop its
anti-ballistic missile system, and because of the wars
in Kosovo and Chechnya. In addition, relations be-
tween the US and China were strained because of
the US plans to develop an anti-missile system, and
because of American accusations that China was
conducting nuclear espionage.
2. Duma ratified eTST
and START II
From what has been said it can be concluded
that the review process is not functioning above all
because of deep differences in the thinking and in-
terests of the leading powers, both among the recog-
nised nuclear powers themselves, and between the
nuclear and the non-nuclear powers. Most states that
have signed the NPT want the review process to func-
tion better, so that the intention of the NPT can be
implemented in a practical way, the objective being
to step up the non-proliferation regime through the
development of better mechanisms to enable the full
application of, and responsibility to, the NPT. The
nuclear powers tend towards a minimalist approach,
to such an extent that it is sometimes clear from the
approach of some of the nuclear states that they re-
gret they ever agreed to the document Principles and
Intentions for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons and for Disarmament, the implementation
of which is the constant aim of the non-nuclear states.
The question that we have to ask is whether the NPT
can survive in the new mood of international rela-
tions, or if it is condemned to failure, with the si-
multaneous growth in the number of nuclear states.
During 1995 the State Parties of the NPT set
up a programme for nuclear disarmament including:
1) drawing up the CTBT by 1996, 2) negotiations
about the Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty - FMCT
and 3) determined endeavours to set in motion sys-
tematic and progressive nuclear disarmament. Al-
though the CTBT was ready for ratification in 1997,
it had to go through many trials before it was ready
to come into force, including the accession of all the
nuclear-capable states. The non-ratification of the
CTBT by the American Senate at the end of 1999
must be counted one of the trump cards for not join-
ing the treaty by those countries that were develop-
ing nuclear arms. At the same time, however, ratifi-
I
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cation of the CTBT by the Russian Duma and the
so-called ratification of Start II can only strengthen
right-wing tendencies in the American Congress, or
those who advocate a strengthening of the Ameri-
can nuclear doctrine, or defence policy.
We should recall that the Duma ratified not
only the CTBT (21 April 2000) but, after seven years
of procrastination, START II as well (19 April 2000).
By ratifying START II Russia, like the US, obligated
itself to reduce its nuclear arsenal to a ceiling of about
3,500 nuclear warheads by the year 2007. The only
controversial thing is the fact that in the protocol
about the ratification of START II the Duma reserved
for itself the right to withdraw from START II should
the USA stick to its intention of developing a lim-
ited anti-missile defence system.'
Many analysts consider that by ratifying these
two treaties, Russia wants to move the nuclear ball
into America's court, that is, free itself of any blame
in the event of further non-proliferation negotiations
coming to nothing. For START II to come into power,
the American Senate, which ratified the Treaty it-
self in 1997, has to ratify Russian amendments to it,
which include the Russian provision about quitting
START II should the ABM Treaty of 1972 be
changed. But if the Senate is incapable of ratifying
the amendments to the START II Treaty, it can be
assumed that in return it will put off ratification of
CTBT indefinitely.
The non-nuclear states sent unambiguous
messages to the nuclear states during the sixth Re-
view Conference that without implementation of the
nuclear disarmament process, the heart of the non-
proliferation programme would be discredited. To
support their attitudes, the non-nuclear states drew
attention to the stagnation of the START II process
between the USA and Russia, and sought renewed
confirmation by NATO in April 1999 that nuclear
arms would continue to playa key role in the Alli-
ance's Strategic Concept and in the newly made
National Security Concept announced in January
2000 by the Russian Federation.
3. The New Agenda Coalition
The central approach to nuclear disarmament
appeared at the time after the advisory opinion of
the International Court of Justice in July 1996 with
respect to the (un)lawfulness of using nuclear weap-
ons and was entitled the New Agenda Coalition. 3 One
of the main proposals of the Coalition was to set up
a subsidiary body within the NPT the task of which
would be to discuss practical measures to reduce the
nuclear threat and reduce the importance of the role
of nuclear weapons in defence strategies. Possible
topics for debate were: greater transparency and a
system of control for nuclear arsenals and nuclear
material stockpiles; de-alerting of nuclear weapons,
and taking the warheads off rocket systems; reduc-
tion of dependence on tactical nuclear weapons, in-
cluding their abolition; no-first-use guarantees by
individual nuclear states, and the initiation of talks
for the drawing up of a legal instrument that would
guarantee the non-nuclear states that nuclear weap-
ons would not be used against them, and that no threat
to use nuclear weapons against them would be made
(negative security assurances); the halting of the
modernisation of nuclear weapons, the prevention
of an arms race in space through stepping up control
of the proliferation of rocket systems, and the
multilateralisation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty of 1972.
Unfortunately, the nuclear states look upon the
Coalition with greater distrust than they do the de-
mands of the non-aligned countries, mostly because
the Coalition is above all seeking the application of
what the nuclear powers have, at least in principle,
agreed to. It is significant that more and more coun-
tries of the West (and the EU) are supporting or at
least not opposing the demands of the Coalition. This
became clear with the support obtained by Resolu-
tion 54 of the UN General Assembly about the New
Agenda.' According to the interventions of repre-
sentatives of the nuclear powers at the first commit-
tee of the General Assembly of the UN it is clear
that they understand the main intent of the resolu-
tion to interfere in their bilateral and multilateral talks
about nuclear disarmament, which they consider
counter-productive. They are against not just the
substance of the New Agenda, but the very idea be-
hind the initiative. In other words, the nuclear pow-
ers consider that they are exclusively competent to
deal with their own programmes for nuclear disar-
mament, and that in the current circumstances they
need no help from outside.
Here it would be a good idea to give a brief
review of the current situation of the American nu-
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clear disarmament programme, primarily because of
the US's role as the leading nuclear power, and be-
cause of the undoubted influence of the US on the
non-proliferation process world-wide. It is a fact that
since 1970 the US has reduced the number of strate-
gic and non-strategic nuclear forces, destroyed whole
generations of nuclear weapons, and started off and
successfully concluded the SALT and START talks
with the USSR, later with Russia. Without releasing
precise numbers, which the US considers a military
secret, the US announced that they have eliminated
80% of their non-strategic nuclear forces, reduced
their nuclear forces in Europe by 90%, will reduce
their strategic nuclear forces by 66% when START
II is implemented, and by 80% when START III
comes into force. Several branches of the armed
forces no longer have nuclear capacity (the army,
the marines, and the navy, excluding the tactical sub-
marine fleet, which can fire nuclear rockets only at
the order of the president). We should recall that
when the obligations undertaken in START II have
been fulfilled, the Russia and US should have at their
disposal not more than 3,000 to 3,500 warheads.
The US unilaterally abandoned several sys-
tems of nuclear weaponry, thus showing that they
did not wish to modernise or replace several kinds
of obsolescent arms. The US claims that its nuclear
forces are no longer on alert and that they no longer
have any target plan. The state of readiness of the
nuclear forces can be measured in days now, in some
cases in weeks, unlike the earlier minutes. The US
earmarked $3.2 billion to help Russia, the Ukraine
and other ex-Soviet states to destroy nuclear war-
heads and other equipment, such as submarines,
bombers and ICMB silos. For example, with Ameri-
can help, since 1992 some 4,890 strategic nuclear
warheads have been deactivated in Russia and the
Ukraine. Since 1960 the US has not produced ura-
nium or plutonium for nuclear weapons. All 14 plu-
tonium production reactors in the US have been
closed down for good since 1989. Since 1993, the
US has pronounced 226 tons of fission material sur-
pluses to defence needs, and it will be endeavoured
to include this material in the IAEA Safeguards Pro-
gramme. The USA has a big programme for looking
after its fission material. Since the US has pro-
nounced a moratorium on the production of this
material, and since fission material can change its
chemical properties in time, the safeguarding pro-
gramme requires careful monitoring.
Since reduction in the number of warheads is
not the same as nuclear disarmament, we might won-
der why the US refuses to take part in talks leading
to nuclear disarmament, as required by Article VI of
the NPT. By way of answer, the US stresses that it is
important to go on step by step, so that after suc-
cessful bilateral talks, or the reduction of nuclear
forces, they would arrive at a situation in which
multilateral talks with other nuclear and with non-
nuclear states would have some sense. The US say
that any talks including several countries would be
sure to become deadlocked, and that the country first
wants to build up bilateral successes, then bring other
nuclear powers into the process, only later including
other countries as well. Although deadlines are not
mentioned, the representatives of the US hint that
multilateral talks could start only after the implemen-
tation of START III, when the Russia and US would





The US believes that the only logical continu-
ation of multilateral talks in this field would be the
adoption of a Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty, and
that only successful talks to this end would be a sign
that negotiations about the question of nuclear dis-
armament could successfully be shifted to a multi-
lateral forum.' American representatives have at sev-
eral international forums stressed that the US unam-
biguously supports and respects the provisions of the
NPT, particularly of Article VI to do with the need
for member states to start off as soon as possible
negotiations in good faith about effective measures
to stop the nuclear arms race and bring about nu-
clear disarmament, and also a treaty for general and
total disarmament under strict and effective interna-
tional control. However, they say that the US will
accept broader multilateral talks only when the con-
ditions for this have been reached. In the meantime
the USA will go on with the bilateral talks about
START III with Russia.
With respect to the Hair Trigger Alert Sys-
tem, the US claims that most of the nuclear forces of
the US are no longer on alert and that the HTAS is
"
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no longer necessary. The problems for the US are
related to the obsolescent Russian warning system,
and the US has solved this by setting up together
with Russia a joint Early Warning System, so that
the system of balance of powers should not be com-
promised. The US stresses that it is not just a ques-
tion of the deactivation of nuclear warheads, because
for broader deactivation, there should be a credible
verification system, to make sure that the warheads
are not re-activated. Otherwise we could have the
situation in which the deactivation of nuclear war-
heads without verification might mean the
destabilisation of the whole system and the compro-
mising of the system of the balance offorces. This is
why the US has not de-alerted all its nuclear war-
heads.
To do with the Limited National Missile De-
fence system, LNMD, the US say that they are head-
ing towards the development of such a system only
because certain countries are developing far-reach-
ing rocket systems that might be a threat to the US.
The world is not what it was 28 years ago, say the
Americans, and the threat of the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction is realistic, is growing,
and is increasingly unpredictable. The US is of the
opinion that although the proliferation of this tech-
nology should not have occurred, it nevertheless has,
and blames those who facilitated it (China, for ex-
ample), saying that they should have been aware of
the consequences. In connection with this, the US
representatives say that four out of the five nuclear
states are carrying out their nuclear disarmament
programmes in an increasingly transparent manner
while the fifth, China, is going on modernising its
nuclear forces, not allowing these plans to be seen,
and building new missile bases at sites that give cause
for concern.
Representatives of the US stresses that the
possible deployment of the LNMD is aimed against
some tens of nuclear warheads. The US believes that
the development of this kind of defence does not go
against the ABM Treaty of 1972, and does not rep-
resent any threat to the strategic stability of relations
between the US and Russia. For this reason the US
now says that it is talking with Russia about a modi-
fied ABM Treaty that would allow for the deploy-
ment of LNMD on both sides, and would in no way
entail a cancellation of the Treaty."
On the other hand, it is the strategic interest
of Russia and China to start talks about the preven-
tion of an arms race in space - PAROS. Both states
eloquently warn that one of their main problems in
the domain of disarmament is the insistence of the
US on changes to the ABM Treaty, which these two
countries consider unacceptable. China in particular
thinks that in developing an anti-rocket system, the
USA is continuing to put through its policy of world
hegemony, and that it is using defence organisations
like NATO for its own purposes, and is also interfer-
ing in the internal affairs of sovereign states. This
almost openly hostile stance with respect to the US
can be interpreted as a continuation of China's dis-
trust about the spread of American influence around
the world, and because of the disagreement of China
with the intervention of the West in Yugoslavia
(Kosovo), especially after the bombing of the Chi-
nese embassy in Belgrade and the death of two em-
bassy employees. Further, one should not neglect
Chinese indignation about the policy of the West (the
US) towards China in other areas of international
relations, such as the strained talks about the entry
of China into the World Trade Organisation and at-
tempts of the US to have an anti-China resolution
adopted in the UN Human Rights Commission in
Geneva.
5. ABM Treaty and deployment
of anti-missile missiles
China and Russia recall that the ABM Treaty
of 1972 bans the development, testing and deploy-
ment of anti-missile missiles or parts of them in
space. Although the Treaty itself does contain pro-
visions that enable modifications, or amendments,
Russia stresses that these changes should only be
directed towards an enhancement of the Treaty, and
should only reinforce the deterrence policy. They say
that the proposal of the US to change the ABM Treaty
so as to develop and deploy a limited national sys-
tem of anti-missile defence flies in the face of the
fundamental provisions of Article 1 of the treaty. In
other words, should the Treaty be modified so as to
permit the deployment of a limited NMD system,
this would be a precedent that would permit and pro-
mote the expansion of military potentials.
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Russian representatives in New York and Ge-
neva determinedly stress that in the event of the US
carrying out its LNMD plans unilaterally, the ABM
Treaty would be annulled as far as they are con-
cerned. The structure of other treaties and agreements
in the domain of disarmament would also fall to
pieces. Russia thinks that the preservation of the
Treaty is in the interests of the US, and that to de-
stroy it would place a great question mark against
all that has been achieved in the area of nuclear dis-
armament, the non-proliferation of nuclear arms and
the control of disarmament in the last thirty years. In
connection with this, Russia categorically denies
rumours that it is negotiating with the US about some
modification to the ABM Treaty.
China's position is similar to the Russian, with
the addition that China rhetorically emphasises that
attempts to set up controls in space are the expres-
sion of the aspiration of one state to establish unilat-
eral and strategic advantages at any cost. China holds
it against the US that it is making it impossible for
other states to exercise their right to contribute to
the use of space for peaceful purposes. China and
Russia recall Resolution 54/53 of the General As-
sembly of the UN, which seeks the re-establishment
of the Ad-hoc Committee for the prevention of the
arms race in space at the CD, supported by 162 states.
China warns that in the event of changes to or
revocation of the ABM Treaty there are two sce-
narios. One is that other states will accept the reali-
ties of this state of affairs, without at all attempting
to oppose the aspirations of a state to create absolute
superiority in the domain of nuclear and conventional
weapons, both on land and in space. Second, other
states, among which China would be counted, will
take appropriate measures for self-defence, the re-
sults of which will be unpredictable. Although China
is the only nuclear power that publicly supports the
policy of giving the non-nuclear powers negative
security assurances and no-first-use guarantees, just
like the other nuclear states, at no international fo-
rum has it advocated the initiation of multilateral
talks about universal nuclear disarmament under in-
ternational control and with a strict timetable, as the
NAM demands.
Russian nuclear doctrine was recently rede-
fined by presidential decision N24 of January 2000,
which approved a new national security concept. In
essence this expands the scenario under which Rus-
sia can resort to nuclear weapons. The national se-
curity document of 1997 contains provisions that seek
the use of nuclear weapons in the event of a threat to
the survival of the Russian Federation as an inde-
pendent state. In the new concept, it is stated that the
use of nuclear weapons is permi tted for the needs of
defence against armed aggression, against Russia or
her allies, in the event that all other methods for cri-
sis solving have been used and proved ineffective.'
Some non-nuclear states are afraid that insist-
ing on nuclear disarmament might end up in a blind
alley because the nuclear states would simply dig
their heels in. Irrespective of the fact that full agree-
ment about the agreed agenda for nuclear disarma-
ment is perhaps unreal, the nuclear states, which are
increasingly divided among themselves, will soon
lack legally valid arguments for not accepting mecha-
nisms within the NPT system for the adoption of
practical measures for further activities. However,
although divided, the nuclear powers are still carry-
ing out an almost identical policy when it is a matter
of their own programmes of nuclear disarmament.
For example, during the Sixth Review Conference,
France read out a joint statement on behalf of the
five nuclear powers, in which they stressed their
undoubted acceptance of the ultimate objective of
the total elimination of nuclear weapons and draw-
ing up of a treaty about universal and total disarrna-
ment under strict and effective international control.
However, they mentioned no kind of table, nor did
they propose a model through which this would be
implemented.
Further, to do with the obligations arising from
Article VI of the NPT, the sixth paragraph of the
Joint Statement stated that the 1995 Review Confer-
ence adopted an action programme for the imple-
mentation of Article VI, and that much had been done
according to this programme at multilateral, bilat-
eral and unilateral levels. It is significant that there
is no word about further P-5 procedures with respect
to their obligations under Article VI, including the
total implementation of it. This statement of the nu-
clear powers let it be clearly understood that this was
all that the state parties of the NPT could expect at
that time, which in essence means that the nuclear
states would still interpret their obligations under
Article VI according to their own criteria, and not
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according to the criteria and demands of the non-
aligned movement or the New Agenda Coalition."
When the NPT was indefinitely extended in
1995, the main architects of the reinforced review
process, the RSA, Germany and Canada really
wanted a powerful and vigorous nuclear weapons
non-proliferation regime. They seriously thought and
hoped that a strengthening of the stability of the NPT
through its indefinite prolongation, with concrete
mechanisms for the measurement of progress, and
the maintenance of multilateral pressure for its im-
plementation would thwart any weakening of the
NPT process by potential nuclear states, new
proliferators", and be against the existing doctrines
of the recognised nuclear states. For this reason, many
hold that an extension of the NPT would be impos-
sible without simultaneous acceptance of three de-
cisions - about the strengthening of the review proc-
ess, the principles and intentions of the non-prolif-
eration of nuclear armaments, and about the Middle
East. At the same time, many of the non-aligned states
wanted to block an unlimited prolongation because
they thought they would lose the leverage that they
had had so far against the nuclear states. Now, when
they have actually agreed to unlimited prolongation,
many in the NAM think they no longer have any cards
up their sleeves with which to force the nuclear states
to respect their NPT obligations, in particular with
respect to universal and total nuclear disarmament.
5. Conclusion
However, although it is said that the NPT is
one of the most successful treaties in history, with
almost universal membership, it could very soon fall
apart if a few nations retain nuclear arms as a status
symbol, and if they remain loyal to their nuclear doc-
trines that nuclear weapons are a guarantee of world
security. If a sufficient number of non-nuclear State
Parties of the NPT lose confidence in the point of
the NPT process, i.e., lose their trust that the nuclear
countries will ever start off in good faith negotia-
tions about nuclear disarmament or come to believe
that the NPT no longer has the power to penalise
proliferators and violators of the treaty, then the NPT
regime might very well disappear. The lack of suc-
cess of the sixth Review Conference might only con-
tribute to the further erosion of this trust, and for
this reason should be looked upon as a warning to
prevent the reappearance of such a situation.
Further, the stance that the NPT adopts to-
wards the intentions of potential nuclear states in
South Asia and the Middle East will very likely de-
termine the future credibility of the NPT regime in
the eyes of some important non-nuclear State Par-
ties. In the current political circumstances, it is not
realistic to expect India, Pakistan and Israel to relin-
quish their nuclear potentials or join the NPT in the
near future. There is also no room for these coun-
tries to become recognised nuclear countries with-
out undesirable political and legal consequences. In
the meantime, if these three states are still invited to
join the NPT regime, many countries will accept the
practical argument that it is most essential to per-
suade these defacto nuclear states to respect the pro-
visions and obligations of the NPT not to transfer
nuclear materials and technologies to non-nuclear
states, to join in CBET as soon as possible and to
halt the production of fission material, to set up in-
ternal controls for the non-proliferation of nuclear
materials, and to step up the mechanisms to provide
credible command, communication and control sys-
tems. The only danger in this viewpoint is that the
existence of the three de facto nuclear states be ac-
cepted, outside the framework of the NPT, which
could be a very destabilising factor in South Asia
and the Middle East, and might encourage major
State Parties to reconsider their views and obliga-
tions to the NPT as non-nuclear parties.
It is not, however, the most important thing
whether the Review Conference will adopt some new
document (irrespective of the desirability of this sce-
nario), but whether the open questions and disagree-
ments among the State Parties, such as those ad-
dressed in this essay, are publicly and constructively
discussed, and whether the NPT State Parties still
have confidence in the capacity of the NPT regime
to assure collective security. NPT sessions have sev-
erallegitimate functions, from convening forums at
which State Parties can formally or informally ex-
change opinions about individual matters, and can
set about settling unresolved problems among them-
selves. Although some would like to force through
their ideas at NPT meetings, the role of the NPT (as
envisaged by the 1995 Review Conference) as con-
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troller of collective responsibility towards the pro-
visions of the Treaty, including the various pro-
grammes and coordination with the IAEA, is prima-
rily to ensure better implementation of or adherence
to its provisions.
Although because of the disagreements of the
main world powers mentioned above the Review
Conference did not manage to come to an agreement
on substantial questions of nuclear disarmament, it
still forces the nuclear states to take into considera-
tion and hear out the ideas and demands of the other
State Parties. And of course, the nuclear powers have
to understand that they do not exist in isolation in
the world, and that every country in the world will
1 For the CTBT to come into force the signatures of all the 44
signatory states of the 1996 Conference on Disarmament, CD,
are required; at this conference the CTBTwas in principle agreed
on, including ratification by or agreement of two countries
opposed to the CTBT, India and Pakistan.
2 This protocol includes the provision that implementation of
START II by Russia will depend on whether the USA continues
with its development of an anti-rocket system, which Russia and
China are greatly opposed to. Russia thinks that the development
of such a system is against the provisions of the ABM Treaty of
1972, and that it will destroy the existing balance of powers among
the leading world powers. If the USA can defend itself against
nuclear attack, that is, then there is for it no longer a nuclear
threat. The US replies that this system will be a defence only
against some rogue states. America is convinced that defence
against a nuclear attack is impossible, which means that the
development of a limited system for defence against rockets
does not in any way flout the ABMTreaty of 1972.
3 The New Agenda Coalition was started by eight leading non-
nuclear states (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, RSA, Mexico, New Zealand,
Sweden and Slovenia, which later withdrew), which wanted to
launch and encourage the whole process of nuclear disarmament
through the confirmation of existing international instruments for
nuclear disarmament, i.e., without the introduction of any new
requirements or criteria. Of course, the nuclear states were very
much against this initiative, considering it yet another attempt to
shift the nuclear disarmament process into the multilateral field,
i.e., to impose conditions on the nuclear powers from outside.
4 See GA Resolution 54/54G of December 1 1999. In the
operative paragraphs the Resolution seeks, among other things,
the implementation of Article VI of the NPT, urgent ratification of
START II and the initiation of START III talks between the US
and Russia, the reduction of dependence on the existing nuclear
doctrine, the calling of a Disarmament Conference to set up
subsidiary bodies to deal with nuclear disarmament, supporting
the idea of the holding of an international conference about
nuclear disarmament, and seeks ratification of the CTBT, the
starting of talks with the CD about the FMCT.
5 At the end of the first part of the CD during 2000, the German
delegation, on behalf of a group of Western nations, including
the US, the UK and France, clearly let it be understood what the
West expects in connection with further talks in the disarmament
area in the CD multilateral forum: 1) the re-establishment of the
Ad Hoc Committee to do with the FMCT, see Report CD/1299;
2) the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee for negative
security assurances; 3) the re-appointment of a special
coordinator for the question of anti-personnel mines, which will
feel any moves they make with respect to nuclear
disarmament, or in the worst case scenario, arma-
ment. Cancellation of the NPT regime can only con-
tribute to the continued appearance of nuclear
proliferators, which can in turn have unpredictable
and very undesirable consequences. Perhaps it is time
for the NPT to propose once more some new rules
for the further progress of the whole process. Per-
haps the NPT needs the establishment of new struc-
tures, such as, for instance, a democratically elected
executive committee or council to act on behalf of
the State Parties between review conferences about
these and other matters. One thing is certain: the NPT
process cannot be allowed to miscarry. •
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take into account existing instruments about mines even outside
the framework of the CD; 4) the re-appointment of a special
coordinator to do with disarmament transparency negotiations;
and 5) the re-appointment of a special coordinator for reviewing
the agenda and improving CD manner of work, as well as an
increase in the membership of the Conference.
6 See the speech of the Secretary of State of the US at the
general debate in 2000 at the Review Conference. Also see the
strategic briefing of the principal deputy assistant of defence
Frank Miller held on March 7 2000 in the UN premises, CD room.
We should say that though Mr Miller's briefing was given in the
CD room, it was neither a formal nor an informal CD meeting,
i.e., the CD kept no minutes of the briefing, for some non-aligned
countries claimed that otherwise they would have the right to
put forward their view of the process of American nuclear
disarmament, which the representatives of the US of course
rejected.
7 It is interesting that in the new national security concept, the
following are stated as fundamental world security threats to
Russia: the tendencies of some states and international
associations to diminish the role and value of existing
mechanisms for guaranteeing international security such as the
UN or the OSCE; the threat to reduce Russian political, economic
and military influence in the world; the reinforcement of military
political blocs and alliances, particularly the spread of NATO to
the East; the possibility of military bases being opened up, and
the strengthening of military presence in the vicinity of the
Russian border.
8 See the joint communique of the French, Chinese, Russian,
British and American delegations at the 2000 Review Conference
in New York, May 1 2000. Although the joint statement does not
have anything new to say about the nuclear policy of individual
P-5 countries, one of the positive elements in the statement is
found in Paragraph 10. Here the nuclear powers not only stress
the importance of collaboration and trust among themselves,
and the promotion of international security and stability, but
openly and categorically state that the nuclear weapons in the
possession of P-5 are not directed against any countries.
9 International efforts with respect to and measures against Iraq
and North Korea aiming at bringing these states back under the
NPT regime after they have violated their obligations to the NPT
stress the weaknesses inherent to the verification mechanisms
of the NPT. Although the IAEA negotiated an additional protocol
regarding the safeguards defined in Article III of the NPT giving
them more authority when they are investigating undeclared
facilities, few states have yet signed or ratified this additional
protocol.
